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Agency theory1. Introduction
The determinants of international joint venture (IJV) instability re-
ceive growing attention in the literature (Fang & Zou, 2010; Yan &
Zeng, 1999). This study adopts the view of Fang and Zou (2010) and
Yan and Zeng (1999) and deﬁnes an IJV as a venture that experiences
conditions such as contract re-negotiation, changes the relationship be-
tween partners, has the potential for unpredictable and premature ter-
mination, and which others perceive as having instability. The majority
of the research into IJV instability, however, discusses the determinants
of instability from a parental perspective (Fang & Zou, 2010; Nakamura,
2005) while ignoring IJV's perspective. This fact represents a notable re-
search gap in IJV instability.
To address this research gap, this study investigates three key factors
of IJV instability from an IJV perspective: (1) Agency theory of parental
opportunism, that is, the opportunism that arises from a parent (princi-
pal) toward an IJV (agent); (2) reactance theory of autonomy, that is,
the degree to which an agent can use its capabilities to pursue some
goals without consent by other party (Barber & Martin, 1999), andai Society and Science Planning
Natural Science foundation of
ontribution as the ﬁrst author.
(V.) Cheng), h.cai@mdx.ac.uk
. This is an open access article under(3) knowledge-based theory of tacit knowledge (TK), that is, the knowl-
edge that one cannot codify and transmit by prescription (Polanyi,
1958). Parents' opportunism toward the IJV is sometimesmore harmful
for both parents and IJV due to wrong norms and expectations, thus
causing distrust and suspicion (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015). According
to agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and considering the par-
ents as the principal and IJV as the agent, principal opportunism may
arise when the principal seeks unilateral gains from the agent (Lado,
Dant, & Tekleab, 2008; Yan, Zhu, & Hall, 2002). TK is a key concern in
the IJV literature that plays a signiﬁcant role in IJV instability (Inkpen
& Beamish, 1997). Particularly, this study seeks to develop an approach
to solve a signiﬁcant IJV puzzle: How do tacit knowledge, parental op-
portunism, and autonomy inﬂuence IJV instability?
This study chooses China as the research context for the study be-
cause China has a more uncertain and unpredictable institutional envi-
ronment (Burgers & Padgett, 2009; Fang & Zou, 2010), and is the largest
FDI recipient (Peng, 2006). The Chinesemarket provides a unique envi-
ronment for IJV and an excellent research context to capture the com-
plexity of IJV instability. This research provides new insights on IJV
instability in emerging market multinational corporations (MNCs);
China offers the perfect scenario to examine the effects of parental op-
portunism, IJV autonomy, and IJV tacit knowledge's inﬂuence on IJV
instability.
This study contributes theoretically to the existing literature on IJV
instability by integrating the agency-, reactance-, and knowledge-
based views to examine the factors that inﬂuence a ﬁrm's propensitythe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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logically by comparing the empirical results of fuzzy-set qualitative
comparative analysis (fsQCA) and multiple regression analysis using a
sample of 203 Chinese-foreign IJVs, which adds further evidence to
the growing methodological consideration regarding complexity theo-
ry. Regarding the contribution on practice, IJV instability in China is a
signiﬁcant and growing economic phenomenon that is of timely con-
cern to managers.
2. Conceptual framework and hypotheses
Several studies examining IJV instability exist. The determinants of
IJV instability depend on the interactions and combinations of numer-
ous factors; a single theory cannot explain their existence and behaviors
(Calvet, 1981). This study adopts a multi-theoretic view by drawing on
elements of agency-, reactance-, and knowledge-based views to formu-
late a more holistic perspective to examine IJV instability in China (see
Fig. 1 for the theoretical framework). Agency theory stresses the role
of principal opportunism, which refers to the opportunism that arises
from a principal with respect to an agent (Lado et al., 2008), which indi-
cates the inharmonious relationship between parents and IJV. However,
knowledge-based view (KBV) theory suggests that a ﬁrm can acquire,
transfer, and embed context-speciﬁc knowledge via inter-ﬁrm coopera-
tion (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 1995). Some studies posit that transferring
tacit knowledge is a key factor in a cooperative parents' relationship,
which may also play a signiﬁcant role in IJV instability (Inkpen &
Beamish, 1997). Indeed, reactance theory focuses on the autonomy in
cooperative relationship, which is useful to discuss the relationship be-
tween an IJV's autonomy and instability.
This interdisciplinary approach reveals how various categories of
factors affect emerging economy's IJV instability.
2.1. Agency theory (of parental opportunism) and IJV instability
Because of divergent interests between principal and agent, inhar-
monious situations and conﬂicts often exist (Yan et al., 2002). Agency
theory literature suggests that the appearance of principal opportunism
is a sign of disharmony between principal (parents) and agent (IJV) in-
harmonious (Foss, Foss, & Nell, 2012; Yan et al., 2002). This disharmony
can affect principal–agent relationship stability. Opportunism may in-
ﬂuence the trust between principal and agents, which can frustrate
the development and maintenance of value-enhancing relationships
(Lado et al., 2008). Under these circumstances, parents may wish to re-
negotiate their IJV contract, change the equity shares in the IJV, or termi-
nate the contract.
Hypothesis 1. Parental opportunism has a positive impact on IJV
instability.Fig. 1. Theoretical framew2.2. Knowledge-based theory (of IJV tacit knowledge) and IJV instability
KBV theory literature suggests that TK is a strategic important
resource and can be a source of competitive advantage (Kogut & Zander;
Teece, 1982). The rarer and more valuable the TK that a ﬁrm has,
the greater the chances that a ﬁrm can become a success (Arend,
Patel, & Park, 2014). Because of the nature of the TK–complex and
difﬁcult to codify or transfer systematically (Polanyi, 1958; Zander &
Kogut, 1995)–once an agent establishes a high level of TK, the agent be-
comes very powerful and has strategic importance for the principal
(Mudambi & Navarra, 2004).
When an IJV has a high level of TK, to not lose the TK, the parentswill
be less likely to cause instability in the IJV because instability such as
unpredicted and premature termination leads the parents to lose the
IJV's TK. If termination of the IJV is in the original plan, the parents pre-
pare the transfer of TK to themselves before termination. To not lose TK,
the parents avoid the IJV's premature termination before successfully
transferring TK.
Hypothesis 2. IJV's tacit knowledge has a negative effect on IJV
instability.2.3. Reactance theory (of IJV autonomy) and IJV instability
In principal–agent relationship, an agent's autonomy inﬂuences the
relationship because an autonomous agent can be very powerful and re-
ject principal's order (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). Principal, therefore,
cannot ensure the achievement of its goals through the agent. Thus,
the principal is likely to re-examine, adjust, modify, and improve the
current condition of the agent to ensure the achievement of their
goals, whichmay lead IJV to instability. The above explanation of the re-
lationship between IJV's autonomyand instability draws from reactance
theory (Brehm& Brehm, 1981). Reactance theory suggests that, in a co-
operative relationship, the degree of autonomy restriction increases the
controlled party's (parents) psychological reactance, which results in
raising the controlled party's (parents) motivations to withdraw auton-
omy (Homburg & Prigge, 2014). Therefore, IJV instability occurs.
Hypothesis 3. IJV's autonomy has a positive impact on IJV instability.2.4. Interaction of autonomy and tacit knowledge moderates the effect of
parental opportunism on IJV instability
When an IJV has higher levels of autonomy and tacit knowledge,
parents are less likely to let opportunism hurt the IJV. In addition,
when an IJV has higher levels of autonomy and tacit knowledge, even
though parents may act opportunistically, they are less likely to makeork for IJV instability.
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premature change to the IJV may result in loss of the tacit knowledge of
the IJV.
Hypothesis 4. The interaction of autonomy and tacit knowledge mod-
erates the effect of parental opportunism on IJV instability.3. Method
3.1. Sample and data
China is the host country for this study for the following reasons: In
China, legal institutions to supportmarket transactions are not abundant;
the institutional environment carries high risks for parents and IJV's busi-
ness operation (Luo, 2000). Data comes from ﬁve areas that share com-
mon characteristics: Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Guang Zhou, and
Chongqing (He & Xie, 2006). This study used Shenkar and Zeira's
(1987) criteria to select the IJVs. The study created a database of IJVs spe-
ciﬁcally for this analysis, because no existing sampling framework is
available. The database drew from private and public sources: Dun and
Bradstreet and ZSHY Investment Advisory, and Qiyetuigang and Waizi
Mingluji. The sample comprises of 2099 joint ventures including both
JVs and IJVs: 325 were in Hong Kong, 432 in Beijing, 999 in Shanghai,
250 in Guangzhou, and 93 in Chongqing. After excluding the JVs and un-
qualiﬁed IJVs, a total of the sample comprises of 751 qualiﬁed IJVs.
The study randomly chose 60 IJVs and sent three questionnaires to
each IJV as a pilot study. The full-scale primary data collection method
was a mail survey. The study also used intensive follow-up telephone
calls at this stage to encourage participation.With 283 responses, the re-
sponse rate is of 38% (283/751). We followed Hair et al.’s (2006) ap-
proach to assess data validity. The study validated 203 IJV cases in the
ﬁnal dataset.3.2. Common method variance (CMV) and non-response bias
The recommendations of Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff
(2003) applied to control for CMV through the questionnaire design
and a statistical remedy. To test the non-response bias, the study used
Armstrong and Overton's (1977) recommendations (see Appendix 1
for details).3.3. Measures
The study draws from the literature and adopts scales for the mea-
surements in this analysis (Appendix 2 lists the items and their
references).Table 1
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
Mean Std. Deviation 1 2
1. Instability 1.924 .643
2. Opportunism 1.923 .845 .577⁎⁎
3.Tacit_Knowledge 2.681 .916 −.070 −.051
4. Autonomy 2.312 .767 .229⁎⁎ .135
5. Years 13.32 8.165 −.104 −.039
6. Total number of staff in the IJV 2177.75 5915.955 −.032 −.037
7. Financial performance 3.63 1.037 −.142⁎ −.186
8. Equity share 18.829 22.072 .079 .090
9. Parents prior cooperation .389 .482 −.025 .069
10. Technology industry .7143 .452 .203⁎⁎ .085
Notes: The asterisk *(**) indicates that the correlation coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at the 0.05(0.01
N = 203.3.4. Measurement validity
The study performed conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess
the measurement validity.
To calculate the results for CFA, the study used AMOS 21 with max-
imum likelihood estimation (MLE). At this stage, the study retained 16
items. As Appendix 2 shows, all values for CFA are well above the re-
spective recommended levels (Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994; Fornell
& Larcker, 1981), thus indicating goodmeasurement validity. The corre-
lationmatrix in Table 1 shows the absence ofmulticollinearity (Emory &
Cooper, 1991). Following Fornell and Larcker (1981)'s method, the re-
sults indicated that for each construct the average variance extracted
(AVE) was much higher than the squared correlation between each
pair of the constructs (see Appendix 2), thus supporting the discrimi-
nant validity for all constructs. In addition, the study used pattern ma-
trix and found that no issues of cross-loading, further supporting
discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2006).3.5. Data analysis method
The study employs a moderated hierarchical regression technique
and the three-way interaction (Handley & Angst, 2014; Hayes,
2013) to assess the model that the study proposes. To analyze causal
asymmetric relationships that multiple regression analysis cannot
test, the study uses fsQCA. To analyze the data with fsQCA, the
study calibrates the variables into fuzzy set membership scores
following Wu, Yeh, Huan, and Woodside's (2014) principle of
calibration. For a 5-point Likert scale, for example, normally the thresh-
old for full membership is 5 (fuzzy score = .95), 1 as the threshold
for full non-membership (fuzzy score = .05), and 3 as the cross-
over point (fuzzy score = 0.50). However, the variable IJV instability
lean more toward the lower end: the average is 1.91 (Table 2)
far lower than the cross-over point of 3. The thresholds for IJV
calibration are therefore set as (1 = .05, 3 = .50, 4 = .95, and 5 = 0).
In addition, as of the majority of cases their IJV instability is below 3,
the analysis should not only explore the occurrence of IJV instability
but also the non-occurrence of IJV instability which is particularly
suitable to apply fsQCA. For continuous variables such as ﬁrm age,
ﬁrm size, equity share, the calibration process uses percentiles, 50% as
the threshold for the cross-over point, 95% and above as the full
membership, 5% and below as the full non-membership. The study
then apply fsQCA 2.5 software to identify which conﬁgurations exhibit
high scores in the outcome (Ragin, 2009) and the negation of the out-
come. Following Fiss (2011), the study set up 2 as theminimum for fre-
quency and .90 as the cut-off point for consistency. The study further
compares the intermediate solution with parsimonious solution to
ﬁnd out the core conditions, peripheral conditions, and necessary
conditions.3 4 5 6 7 8 9
−.085
−.051 −.060
.060 −.062 .099
⁎⁎ .214⁎⁎ .053 −.031 −.046
.164⁎ .024 .091 −.060 .097
−.317⁎⁎ −.100 .058 −.068 −.087 −.048
.181⁎⁎ .023 −.039 .067 .196⁎⁎ .011 −.200⁎⁎
) level (two-tailed, Pearson).
Table 2
Results of moderated hierarchical regression.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b t-Value b t-Value b t-Value b t-Value
IJV Age −.107 −1.562 −.077 −1.348 −.074 −1.291 −.079 −1.388
IJV Size −.039 −.572 −.006 −.114 −.010 −.171 −.019 −.339
Financial performance −.204⁎⁎⁎ −2.922 −.083 −1.392 −.080 −1.331 −.084 −1.419
Equity share .104 1.514 .051 .888 .048 .809 .039 .676
Parents' prior cooperation .014 .208 −.034 −.556 −.026 −.429 −.035 −.579
Technology industry .243⁎⁎⁎ 3.445 .174⁎⁎⁎ 2.951 .157⁎⁎ 2.590 .154⁎⁎ 2.574
Autonomy .145⁎⁎ 2.512 .136⁎⁎ 2.260 .207⁎⁎⁎ 3.146
Parental opportunism .518⁎⁎⁎ 8.833 .492⁎⁎⁎ 7.221 .454⁎⁎⁎ 6.583
Tacit knowledge −.068 −1.099 −.055 −.865 −.074 −1.160
Two-way interaction
1.Autonomy ∗ opportunism .028 −.371 .198⁎ 1.963
2. Opportunism ∗ tacit knowledge .012 .191 −.094 −1.257
3.Autonomy ∗ tacit knowledge .076 1.145 −.026 −.372
Three-way interaction
4.Autonomy ∗ opportunism ∗ tacit knowledge .254⁎⁎ 2.487
R square .099 .398 .404 .423
Adjusted r square .071 .369 .366 .383
⁎⁎⁎ p-value b0.01.
⁎⁎ p-value b0.05.
⁎ p-value b0.10.
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4.1. Findings from multiple regression analysis
Table 3 shows the three causal paths for Model 2. The positive effect
of parental opportunism on IJV instability is highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant. The results for H1 indicate that parental opportunism toward an
IJV increases its instability. The effect of an IJV's tacit knowledge on an
IJV's instability is insigniﬁcant due to the appearance of a standardized
coefﬁcients beta and a high p-value, which does not affect IJV instability
(H2). The relationship between autonomy (H3) and instability is signif-
icantly positive. To test H4, the study uses a three-way interaction tech-
nique to conduct hypothesis testing. The results show that none of the
two-way interactions in Model 3 are statistically signiﬁcant.
The three-way interactions in Model 4 are statistically signiﬁcant.
The analysis of the graphs (see Fig. 2) presents the nature of the interac-
tion effect by plotting the relationship between parental opportunism
and instability according to the level of the interaction term of tacit
knowledge and autonomy (Aiken & West, 1991). The plot shows that
the interaction of autonomy and tacit knowledge does not moderate
the positive impact of opportunism on instability, thereby not
supporting H4 (Table 5 shows the results of hypothesis tests).
4.2. Findings from fsQCA
To detect the existence of causal asymmetric relationships the study
calculates the percentile indices of each variable. The research then ex-
amines the cross-tabulations of each of the predictor variable with the
percentile of IJV instability. A sample cross-tabulation shows that 7Table 3
Results of hypothesis testing.
Hypothesis 1 Parental opportunism has a
positive impact on IJV instability.
Supported Beta .518*** p = .000
Hypothesis 2 The tacit knowledge which is
held by an IJV has a negative effect on IJV
instability.
Not Supported Beta−.068 p= .279
Hypothesis 3 IJV's autonomy has a positive
impact on IJV instability.
Supported Beta .145** p = .013
Hypothesis 4 The interaction of autonomy
and tacit knowledge moderates the effect
of parental opportunism on IJV instability
Not Supported Beta .254** p = .014cases exist when IJV instability is high while autonomy is low (see
Table 4). However, 16 + 11 = 27 cases exist when autonomy is high
and IJV instability is low. In other words, even if the results support
H3 (autonomy positively relates to instability) statistically, 7 + 27 =
34 cases exist strongly against H3, accounting for 34/203 = 17% of the
overall sample. The case evidence clearly indicates the existence of
causal asymmetric relationships.
Table 5 presents results from fsQCA. The fsQCA software provides
three types of solutions: A complex solution, an intermediate solution,
and a parsimonious solution. Following Cheng, Chang, and Li (2013)'s
recommendation, Table 5 provides intermediate solutions. The models
use IJV instability and its negation as outcomes respectively, tacit
knowledge, autonomy, parental opportunism, and all of the six control
variables as predictor variables.
The study achieves 12 solutions (see Table 5): Five solutions for IJV
stability as outcome (Model 1), seven solutions for the negation of IJV
stability as outcome (Model 2). The overall solution coverage for
Model 1 is .43; the solution's consistency is .979 (above the .75 thresh-
old). The overall solution coverage forModel 2 is .42; the solution's con-
sistency is .99. Both models cover a substantive of the outcome
membership. These results contrast with themultiple regression results
of adjusted R square of less than 40% in for all models (see Table 2). Re-
garding the solutions in Table 5, Model 1 indicates that the absence of
parental prior cooperation is the necessary conditions of IJV stability. So-
lution 1 suggests that in high-tech industry, joint high scores of ﬁrm
performance, equity share, autonomy, together with low scores of pa-
rental opportunism, parental prior cooperation, tacit knowledge, and
ﬁrm age, are sufﬁcient condition to predict IJV instability. Model 2 pro-
vides seven solutions that predict non-occurrences of IJV instability.
Model 2 indicates that the absence of autonomyand absence of parental
opportunism are the necessary conditions of non-occurrence of IJV
instability. The ﬁrst solution in Model 2, Solution 6, indicates that irre-
spective of the industry high scores of parental prior cooperation con-
junctures with low scores of all other variables predict the non-
occurrence of IJV instability. Solution 7 provides a similar recipe but
stresses that in high-tech industry, irrespective of ﬁrm age, the same
combinations of other variables as in Solution 6 predicts the non-
occurrence of IJV instability. Similarly, Table 5 presents nine more rec-
ipes, providing a far richer picture than the results frommultiple regres-
sion analysis. Because of space limitation, the study omits discussion for
other models in Table 5.
Fig. 2. Interactions of parental opportunism, autonomy and tacit knowledge on instability.
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5.1. Discussion of empirical results
Overall, the results for parental opportunism accord with the view
that opportunism damages the relationship between two parties, and
thus preventing opportunism is necessary (Lumineau & Quélin, 2012).
More speciﬁcally, the results are line with previous studies of the
principal-agent context that postulate that principal opportunism does
damage a principal–agent relationship (Foss et al., 2012; Yan et al.,
2002). Autonomy is a critical factor in explaining IJV instability, thus,
conﬁrming the reactance theory perspective. This perspective posits
that autonomy restriction increases the controlled party's (parents)
psychological reactance, which leads the controlled party's (parents)
to reestablish the forgone autonomy from the controlling party
(IJV)(Homburg & Prigge, 2014). This study, however, does not ﬁnd
that TK in an IJV has a direct effect on instability (H2) or that the inter-
action of TK and autonomymoderates the relationship between paren-
tal opportunism and instability (H4). On the contrary, the results
indicate that the interaction of TK and autonomy strengthens the posi-
tive relationship between parental opportunism and instability. The in-
signiﬁcant result of H2 and the opposite result of H4 may be due to the
IJV in China; parents may have joint learning between each other or
with the IJV (Fang & Zou, 2010). When joint learning exists, both IJVs
and parents can develop tacit knowledge, whichmay result in the insig-
niﬁcant effect of H2 and the opposite result of H4.
Whilst the hypothesis testing was unable to ﬁnd individual predic-
tors at play, the results of fsQCA complement statistical analysis by sug-
gestingmulti-conﬁgurations of different factors which can achieve non-
occurrences of IJV instability in addition to the occurrence of IJV instabil-
ity. The ﬁndings demonstrate clearly the importance of the combinationTable 4
Percentile group of autonomy * percentile group of instability cross tabulation.
Percentile group of
instability
Total
1 2 5
Percentile group
of autonomy
1 Count 13 11 7 31
% within percentile
group of autonomy
41.9% 35.5% 22.6% 100.0%
4 Count 11 9 104 124
% within percentile
group of autonomy
8.9% 7.3% 83.9% 100.0%
5 Count 16 2 30 48
% within percentile
group of autonomy
33.3% 4.2% 62.5% 100.0%
Total Count 40 22 141 203
% within percentile
group of autonomy
19.7% 10.8% 69.5% 100.0%of the presence or absence of relevant predictors rather than any single
predictor. Therefore the complexity theory is useful in ﬁnding out asym-
metrical conditions which are unable to manifest in multi-regression
analysis.
5.2. Research contribution
This study incorporates KBV theory, agency theory, and reactance
theory into the analytical framework, thus providing deeper under-
standing of IJV instability in China. First, to our knowledge, this study
is the ﬁrst that uses the principal–agent relationship to study the IJV in-
stability in China. The results demonstrate the usefulness of applying
principal–agent perspective that might provide interesting insights
into future IJV instability research. Second, the empirical ﬁndings add
to the growing literature seeking to understand the determinants of
IJV instability by conducting symmetrical statistical test via multiple re-
gression analysis and examining the causal asymmetrical relationships
via fsQCA. For symmetrical statistical analysis via multiple regressions,
the theoretical argument and empirical evidence suggest that IJV insta-
bility depends on a combination of three factors and moderate interac-
tion. In addition, this study is one of the few studies in international
business that employs a three-way interaction approach to discover
the depth relationship between the constructs. The fsQCA technique is
able to uncover wider solutions to the IJV instability than the three-
way interaction identiﬁes in multiple regression analysis; 12 speciﬁc
combinations between factors such as ﬁrm size, ﬁrm age, ﬁnancial per-
formance, equity, autonomy, tacit knowledge, and parental opportun-
ism lead to the occurrences and non-occurrences of IJV instability. The
power of explanation from the results of fsQCA is therefore greater
than that of the ﬁndings from multiple regressions.
5.3. Managerial implications
First, steering an IJV away from major changes or premature termi-
nation are the most important concerns for IJV managers. Overall, the
empiricalﬁndings suggest that IJVmanagers should be aware that keep-
ing an IJV away from instability requires a low level of parental oppor-
tunism. Second, when granting an IJV a greater level of autonomy,
parents should be careful not to lose their control over selecting activi-
ties andways to achieve their goals and satisfy their interests. Third, the
fsQCA results indicate that the absence of parental prior cooperation is
the necessary condition for IJV instability, whereas the absence of au-
tonomyand the absence of parental opportunismare thenecessary con-
ditions that lead to the non-occurrence of IJV stability. Managers can
consider three conditions to avoid IJV instability. Finally, the results
show that the relationship between IJV instability and its antecedents
is not symmetrical. The fsQCA technique is better than conventional
multiple regression analysis to address this issue. The results from
It
P
B
B
Table 5
FsQCA results: IJV instability as outcomes*.
Model 1: IJV instability as outcomes Model 2: Negation of IJV stability as outcomes
Solutions Solutions
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
IJV age ⊗ ⊗ ● ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ● ● ●
IJV size ⊗ ● ⊗ ● ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ● ⊗
Financial performance ● ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ● ● ● ● ●
Equity share ● ● ⊗ ● ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ●
Parents' prior cooperation ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ● ● ⊗ ⊗ ● ⊗ ⊗
Technology industry ● ● ● ⊗ ● ● ● ⊗ ● ●
Autonomy ● ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
Opportunism ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ● ● ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
Tacit knowledge ⊗ ● ⊗ ● ● ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ●
Raw coverage .28 .23 .26 .06 .26 .09 .05 .16 .14 .06 .14 .12
Unique coverage .04 .00 .01 .06 .01 .02 .01 .05 .03 .04 .03 .05
Consistency .86 .89 .86 .94 .94 .98 .97 .98 1.00 1.00 .99 .99
Overall solution coverage .43 .42
Overall solution consistency .98 .99
N
T
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N
N
A
T
T
T
T
In
T
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P
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stability, other than the three-way interaction.
5.4. Limitations and recommendations
This study considers the IJV's view to discover the antecedents of in-
stability. Thus, data comes from top IJV managers. The distinction be-
tween an IJV's autonomy and parents' control is ambiguous in the
literature. Therefore, obtaining viewpoints from both IJVs and parents
is essential to offer a better overview of the relationship between auton-
omy and instability.
Second, the empirical tests of this study examine parental opportun-
ism toward IJVs in general and donot separatewhether the parental op-
portunism toward an IJV or parental opportunism is a reﬂection of
parental conﬂict. This is a limitation and future research ought to sepa-
rate the two types of parental opportunism for empirical testing. Third,
although the study uses two different analytical methods to analyze the
data, the study does not examine the predictive validity of the results
due to the small sample size. Future researchmayobtain a larger sample
and conduct split sample analysis to check predictive validity.
Appendix 1. Commonmethod bias and non-response bias
The questionnaire design and data collection
1) The survey data was collected from three participants, one for independent variables,
one for dependent variables, one for organization's background and control variables.
2) The dependent and independent variables are developed from different sources
and are different in their notions.
3) Some of the items are deliberately reverse-scored to prevent participants es-
tablishing a response pattern.
4) The questionnaire was originally designed in English and then translated into
Chinese. Three bilingual professional translators assistedwith checking the translation.
5) The questionnaire was reviewed by 15 academics and top business managers
for the fust pilot-testing to make sure the questionnaire was clear and easy to
understand, with no ambiguities or leading questions.
The statistical remedy
1) We used SPSS 21 to carry out Hannan's single-factor analysis and the results
show a 14-factor solution in which the largest factor explained only 19.39% of
the variance, indicating CMV did not exist.
2) Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), we drew a signal factor model including
all the independent, dependent and control variables items as indicators
(Podsakoff et al., 2003).
SEM with maximum likelihood estimation was used to calculate the results and
these show that common method variance is absent from our study (CFI. 342,
GFI, 521, RMR 404.429, RMSEA. 153).
Non-response bias
1) Non-response bias testing is done by comparing early and late response groups
on the assumption that the later response group is more similar to thenon-response group (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The results indicate that
there are no signiﬁcant differences between the early and late groups in terms of
industry type, nationality of foreign parents and IJV's age and size.
2) Further, this research randomly selected 50 IJVs that did not respond to this
research, to compare industry type, nationality of foreign parents, and IJV's age
and size with the responses of the IJVs. The results show no signiﬁcant
differences at the top p b 0.1 level.
Appendix 2. Measurements and results for CFA.ems 5-point Likert scales (1 strongly disagree, 2 disagree, 3 undecided, 4
agree, 5 strongly agree.)CFAarental opportunism reference: Lado et al., 2008 CR = 0.936 AVE = 0.785
MSV = 0.349 ASV = 0.122
oth parents provide overpriced quotations. .827
oth parents provide substandard input. .865
either parent provides all relevant information in a timely manner. .964N
Both parents exaggerate their requirements for the operation of the IJV.
Both parents provide sufﬁcient resources to develop IJV strategies.892(reversed-scale).
either parent misrepresents any aspect of their joint business relationship
to further their own objectives (reversed-scale).
acit knowledge reference: Zander & Kogut, 1995 CR = 0.895 AVE = 0.685
MSV = 0.009 ASV = 0.004 HSC = 088
anuals describing IJV activities and processes can easily be written
(reversed-scale).
rge parts of IJV processes are captured in standard software that can be931modiﬁed for needs (reversed-scale).
xtensive documentation describing critical parts of the business processes.932exists in the IJV (reversed-scale).
ew staff can learn systems and procedures by studying documents and.650manuals in the IJV (reversed-scale).
ew staff can learn systems and procedures by talking to skilled employees in.776the IJV (reversed-scale).
utonomy reference: CR = 0.879 AVE = 0.646 MSV = 0.058 ASV = 0.028
HSC = 0.219
he IJV has the authority to formulate strategic business plans (including
subsequent implementation).
he IJV has the consent of the parent ﬁrms to formulate and implement.739strategic business policies only in limited functional areas (such as human
resources management).
he IJV has the authority to execute R&D roadmaps without the consent of.780parent ﬁrms.
he IJV has the authority to allocate R&D assets without the consent of859parent ﬁrms.
stability reference: Yan & Zeng, 1999 and Fang & Zou, 2010 CR = 0.926832AVE = 0.759 MSV = 0.349 ASV = 0.136 HSC = 0.553
o what extent does the IJV have the following conditions which are not in
the original plan?
here are many lawsuits between two parent ﬁrms.
arent ﬁrms have planned to sell the IJV to a third party..870
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5209L.-Y.(V.) Cheng et al. / Journal of Business Research 69 (2016) 5203–5209arent ﬁrms have planned to terminate the IJV. .935
e IJV's equity agreement has been changed frequently. .831arent ﬁrms plan to sell the IJV to a third party because objectives have
changed.
arent ﬁrms plan to terminate the IJV to redeploy, liquidate or divest assets.
mple size = 203; CFA = Conﬁrmatory factor analysis. CR = Composite
reliability; AVE = Average variance extracted: MSV = Maximum Shared
Variance; ASV = Average Shared Variance. HSC = Highest squared
correlation between each pair of the constructs
easurement model validity: GFI (goodness of ﬁt index) = 906; CFI
(comparative ﬁt index) = 965; RMR (root mean square residual) = .042;
CMIN/DF (Chi-squared Degrees of Freedom) = l.890; RMSEA (Root Mean
Squire Error of Approximation) = .066; TLI (Tucker Lewis Index) = .957
ontrol variables
V Age: The number of years the IJV has been in operation
V Size: The total number of employees in the IJV.
nancial performance: Degree to which the international joint venture ﬁrm
has been ﬁnancially successful.
quity share: Consistent with Steensma and Lyles (2000), equity share is
operationalized by the absolute difference in equity shares between the
foreign parent and the local parent.Parents' prior cooperation: Coding; 1. Local and foreign parents cooperated
prior to establishing the IJV.
2. Local and foreign parents did not cooperate prior to establishing the IJV
chnology industry: Dummy variable: 1 for the classiﬁcation of industries
based on higher technology intensity, high-technology and
medium-high-technology industries (e.g. computing equipment, motor
vehicles, and electrical machines), 0 for the classiﬁcation of industries
based on lower technology intensity, medium-low-technology industries
and low-technology industries (e.g. metal products, food, beverages &
tobacco). The deﬁnition of high technology intensity is based on that used
by the OECD (1996). The sectors that are covered by the OECD deﬁnition
and the UK 1992 SIC codes.References
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